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THE PEARSON REPORT-SOMETHING FOR
EVERYONE?
Judged in political terms, the Report of the Royal Commission on Civil
Liability and Compensation for Personal Injury (the Pearson Commission)
is a remarkable success.[1] It manages to propose reforms which have been
cautiously welcomed by some of those in favour of universal accident
compensation. [2] At the same time, the Commission has not provoked a
major outcry from those interests opposed to radical change, for example
the legal profession and the insurance industry.[3] But although the Pearson
Report is a remarkably successful political document, it is a confused and
intellectually undistinguished report. One is left with the very strong feeling
that the Commission achieved its success by proposing marginal reforms.
What does the Commission propose?
The Commission recommended that industrial injuries benefits should
be increased and the improved industrial injuries scheme would serve as the
basis for a new road accident scheme. The new road accident scheme would
be financed by a levy on petrol and administered by the Department of
Health and Social Security. The Commission also recommended that a
special benefit should be introduced for severely handicapped children
(whatever the cause of their handicaps). All these three classes of no-fault
beneficiaries are to be allowed to continue to sue in tort.
The remaining changes are pretty marginal. Strict liability is to be
introduced in some areas (e.g. for products liability, for vaccinations
recommended by the state and for injuries cause by things or operations of
an unusually hazardous nature). The Commission also recommends some
changes in computing damages; in particular the courts are to be given
power to award index-related periodic payments in cases of death and
serious injury. Social security (but not, inexplicably, private insurance)
benefits are to be deducted in full and non-pecuniary damages are not to be
recoverable in respect of the first three months after the injury.
None of the above changes can be truly described as radical. The most
far-reaching change-that proposed for road accident victims-does not go
IlI The Report of the Royal Commission on Civil Liability and Compensation for Personal
Injury (1978; Cmnd.7054) Vol. 1, Report; Vol. II, Statistics and Costings; Vol. III,
Overseas Systems of Compensation. Unless otherwise indicated, subsequent references
are to Vol. 1.
[21 See e.g. Ogus, Corfield and Harris, "Pearson: Principled Reform or Political
Compromise?" (1978) Indust. L.J. 143, 145 where the authors state: "Certainly, the
arrangements would be more satisfactory than at present, and indeed better than no
reform at all".
[31 The T.U.C. must also be regarded as a major opponent of change. In the words of the
Report: "The T.U.C. told us that their approach had been to see what might be done to
improve the industrial injuries scheme and the tort system, rather than abolish them.
That has been our approach too"; Para. 939.
as far as the recommendations of some law reform commissions in North
America which have recommended abolition of the tort action. [4]
Why not a universal compensation scheme?
The first question that the Commission had to deal with was whether to
adopt a New Zealand type of no-fault scheme. The Commission rejected a
New Zealand type of no-fault scheme but their reasons for doing so are
confusing and contradictory.
In the first place, the Commission argued that recommendation of a
universal compensation scheme was outside their terms of reference since
their terms of reference required them to consider the availability of
compensation for death or personal injury arising in five specified
circumstances: (a) in the course of employment; (b) through the use of a
motor vehicle or other means of transport; (c) through the manufacture,
supply or use of goods or services; (d) on premises beloning to or occupied
by another; (e) otherwise through the act or omission of another where
compensation under the present law is recoverable only on proof of fault or
under the rules of strict liability. The Commission reasoned that since single
activity accidents (e.g accidents in the home) do not fall within the five
prescribed categories, "we were therefore not free to consider recommend-
ing a comprehensive compensation scheme covering all injuries, still less a
universal scheme covering sickness as well". [5] There are several criticisms
to be made of the Commission. Further, as has been pointed out elsewhere:
"there is no reason, for example, why any injury should not be regarded as
coming within category (e), since in practice it is almost always possible to
connect it causally to the act or omission of another". [61
In the second place, it was clearly the intention of the Conservative
government which set up the Commission that the Commission should
consider a New Zealand type scheme of compensation scheme. Thus, Lord
Hailsham, then Lord Chancellor, stated:
Of course I am familiar with the New Zealand work.., obviously the Royal Commission
will want to examine both these and other types of possible models, and indeed the status
quo as a possible model. I should not like to comment upon these various possible
models, but it will be precisely that sort of thing which will engage part of the attention of
the noble and learned Lord, Lord Pearson.... [71
This passage shows beyond any doubt that the government wished the
Pearson Commission to study the New Zealand scheme closely. Thus, the
failure of the Commission to report on the New Zealand scheme, far from
[4] See e.g. The Report of the New York Insurance Department, "Automobile Insurance...
For Whose Benefit?" (1970) and the Ontario Law Reform Commission Report on Motor
Vehicle Accident Compensation (1973).
[5] Para. 239.
[6] Ogus, Corfield and Harris Loc. cit., at p. 144.
[7] 337 H.L.Debs., cols. 974-5 (19 December 1972).
being outside their terms of reference, must be regarded as a serious breach
of duty.
Third, after having said that a New Zealand type scheme was outside
their terms of reference, the Commission cast a side-long glance at the New
Zealand scheme and rejected it for three reasons. The first reason may be
described as perceived social differences, the second reason has to do with
cost and the third reason has to do with the value of negligence as a moral
force and as a deterrent. The first two reasons will be examined in this
section; the third needs extended treatment and will be discussed in a
subsequent section.
As regards the first reason, the perceived social differences between New
Zealand and the United Kingdom, the Commission had this to say:
In considering the relevance of the New Zealand schemes to our own country, it needs to
be remembered that New Zealand has a much smaller population and is predominantly
agricultural. [81
The point here presumably is that New Zealand has a much lower
accident rate than the United Kingdom. But instead of relying on bucolic
stereotypes, the Commission would have been well advised to have found
out whether in fact there was any difference in accident rates between the
two countries. Professor Marc Franklin found, on investigation, that there
was very little difference between accident rates in New Zealand and the
United States.[91 It might well be that there is, similarly, no (or little)
difference in accident rates between New Zealand and the United Kingdom.
The second reason why the New Zealand type solution may have been
rejected is because of cost. In the Commission's words:
Our terms of reference enjoined us to have regard to cost. This has two aspects. First,
there is the total expenditure on compensation in this country. This, in turn, consists
partly of a transfer of purchasing power from non-injured to injured, and partly of the
usage of real resources in the operation and administration of any such transfer. [10]
This passage suggests that a universal system of compensation costs more
than a universal compensation scheme. In fact, the truth might be the
reverse. A universal compensation scheme might be cheaper because there
are: (a) enormous savings in administrative costs;I11] (b) further savings by
[81 Para. 236.
[9] See his article, "Personal Injury Accidents in New Zealand the the United States: Some
Striking Similarities" (1975) 27 Stanford L. Rev. 653.
[101 Para. 240.
[11] The cost of administering social security for injured people is about 11 per cent of the
value of the benefits paid (para. 121), as against 85 per cent in the case of tort
compensation payments (para. 83).
the elimination of damages for non-pecuniary loss;[12] and (c) further
savings through the elimination of overlapping coverages. In short, the
Pearson Commission should have costed not only its own proposals but it
should also have costed a New Zealand type of scheme..If a New Zealand
type scheme cost less than the Pearson proposals and yet compensated
everyone, this would be a highly significant fact. Unfortunately, the
Commission did not attempt this essential task.
The third reason the Commission rejected a universal compensation
scheme was because it perceived the tort system as performing valuable
social goals. It is now necessary to examine what goals the Commission
thought the tort system performs.
The uses of the Negligence System - According to Pearson
According to the Commission, the negligence system achieves two
objectives-the first being the enforcement of moral standards, the second
objective being that of deterrence.
With regard to the first objective-the moral one-the Commission
stated: "There is elementary justice in the principle of the tort action that he
who has by his fault injured his neighbour should make reparation". [13] The
justice of this proposition is not at all evident. In the first place, it fails to take
into account that what the courts have been calling "fault" for decades bears
no relation to anything that any reasonable person would describe as
fault.[14] Defendants have been held liable despite the fact that they have
taken the most elaborate precautions and despite the fact that the court has
been unable to given even a hint of what further precautions the defendants
might have taken.[151
The second doubt about the moral force of negligence is that there is no
correlation between the degree of fault and the amount of compensation the
tortfeasor has to pay. As has been pointed out on countless occasions, a
small amount of negligence may cause thousands of pounds of damage
whereas negligence that should be accompanied by a prison term may cause
only a few pounds damage. A system that produces such results seems to be
an immoral, rather than a moral, system. The Commission never asked itself
why, with the criminal law available, it is necessary to have a second body of
1121 See Para. 382 of the Report which states: "We were struck by the high cost of
compensation for non-pecuniary loss. It accounts for more than half of all tort
compensation for personal injury, and for a particularly high proportion of small
payments".
[131 Para. 262.
[141 See e.g. Croke v. Willett 119731 R.T.R. 411, where a court held that a driver was negligent
in not giving a hand signal as well as a mechanical one.
1151 The classic example here is, of course, the decision of the Privy Council in Grant v.
Australian Knitting Mills, [19361 A.C. 85, In that case the defendant manufacturer was
held liable despite the fact that it had produced 4,737,600 garments without having had a
single complaint and despite the fact that it showed that it took elaborate precautions to
analyse the chemical contents of the garments produced.
law which reflects moral blame. Incredibly, "criminal law" does not even
appear in the index to the Commission's Report!
In addition to its moral role, the Commission also thought that the
negligence system will deter negligent behaviour. Thus, the Commission
stated:
The deterrent effect of tort is in many cases blunted by insurance, but may partly be
preseved by the insurers' premium rating systems-for example, no claims bonuses....
In addition, a tort action may draw attention to dangerous practices, especially in the
industrial sphere. [161
Elsewhere, the Commission stated:
In broad terms, however, there remains an important potential impact on the
tortfeasor's reputation as, say, a professional or businessman. This is the more
significant in that the cases attracting most publicity will tend to be those in which the
tortfeasor contests his liability, and in which liability is therefore the least clear cut.[17]
All these assertions should (and could) have been empirically tested if the
Commission had seen to it that research was done in these particular fields.
Thus, the Commission could have sought research papers on whether the
fear of losing a no-claims bonus makes for safer driving.[18] Again, the
Report could have commissioned research on whether tort actions impede
or help industrial safety.[19] Finally, the Commission could have tried to
find out whether a negligence action had ever caused a manufacturer to
change its method of production. Professor Whitford, in a study undertaken
for the National Commission on Product Safety in the United States, was
unable to find a single example of a case where a manufacturer had changed
its method of manufacture as a result of litigation. [20]
Second, even if research had shown that merit-rating for employers,
drivers and manufacturers had a beneficial effect on the accident rate, there
is no reason why merit-rating could not be adopted in a system of universal
compensation.[21] Indeed, merit-rating is easier to apply in a system of
1161 Para. 262.
1171 Para. 256.
[181 In fact, in Volume II of its Reports, the Commission concludes: "There is no firm
evidence
that experienced drivers who lose their no-claim bonus are more likely to have an accident
than those who do not, or that the system provides a deterrent effect".
[191 The Commission noted at para. 907 that the Robens Committee, in their Report, Safety
and Health at Work (Cmnd.5034) stated that the negligence action might act as a
hindrance to industrial safety because an objective investigation of the circumstances
surrounding accidents is impeded, but the matter is not pursued.
[20] See his study, Products Liability in Supplemental Studies, Vol. 3 Product Safety Law and
Administration: Federal, State, Local, and Common Law 221 (1970).
1211 Thus, the New Zealand Accident Compensation Act 1972, has a merit-rating scheme for
work and road accidents.
universal compensation since it is more difficult under such a system to give
subsidies to activities with poor accident records. [22]
Finally, if the negligence system upholds moral values and deters
negligent conduct, it is impossible to see why the Commission wished to see
fewer actions brought in the two areas where accidents are the most
common-industrial accidents and road accidents. It is in these two areas
that the Commission proposed generous no-fault benefits so that fewer tort
claims can be brought. But if fewer tort claims are brought, will this not-
according to the Commission-have an adverse effect on morality and
deterrence? It is all very puzzling.
The Withering Away of the Negligence Action?
In the areas of road and work accidents, the Commission wished to see
the tort action restricted to serious cases and cases of fatal accidents. The
Commission would achieve this by not awarding non-pecuniary damages in
the first three months after injury and by deducting social security benefits in
full.
It is possible that these recommendations would diminish the number of
tort actions that were brought and the expense of the negligence system.
might be reduced. [23] But it seems that the Commission ignored a number
of factors which might keep the number of tort claims at the same level.
In the first place, so far as industrial accident victims are concerned, there
is likely to be very little change. In most cases, the cost of the action will be
borne by the trade union, and the three month no-pecuniary loss hurdle is
not a difficult one to surmount. Insofar as road accident victims are
concerned, the no-fault benefits might result in fewer claims being brought,
but it is equally likely that more claims will be brought than before. One
deterrent to litigation that existed before the introduction of no-fault
benefits-the impecuniosity of the victim-has now been substantially
affected and it may be that road accident victims will be more ready to press
their claims in the post-Pearson era than before.
But even if there is some saving through fewer tort cases being brought, it
seems that the savings the Commission hoped for in the running of the
negligence system might not occur. This is because the Commission
recommended that index-related periodic payments should be paid in cases
of death or serious injury. The Commission did not seem to appreciate how
expensive an index-related payments scheme would be within a negligence
system.
The Commission noted that the Law Commission in their Working Paper
No. 41 reached the conclusion: "that the introduction of a system of periodic
[22] Thus, it has been alleged that certain insurers sell employers' liability insurance as a "loss
leader" in order to attract more lucrative kinds of insurance; see e.g. Hanna, The Sunday
Times, 8 February 1970.
[23] Tort compensation at the levels proposed by the Commission would still cost £25 million
per annum for work injuries and £90 million for road injuries (Table 19).
payments would meet with vehement opposition from almost every person
or organization actually concerned with personal injury litigation". [24] The
Commission, however, remarked: "But the Law Commission were working
within, and consulting on the basis of narrower terms of reference than our
own".[25] In a sense, the Commission was right; it did have wider terms of
reference than the Law Commission in that it (the Pearson Commission) was
free to consider a universal compensation scheme. But, having rejected a
universal compensation scheme, the Pearson Commission found itself in the
same difficulty as the Law Commission. The insurance companies are as
strongly opposed to a system of periodic payments and to inflation-proof
periodic payments as they ever were. [26]
If a system of index-related periodic payments is introduced, insurance
companies will be forced to increase substantially their offers of payment in
order to avoid having to make periodic payments. This means longer, harder
bargaining than occurred before and substantially higher settlements.
Further, index-related payments will be payable (apart from fatal cases) in
cases of "serious" injury. Since insurance companies have a very strong
interest in not paying index-related payments, the question of what
constitutes a "serious" injury may be the subject of frequent litigation. Since
it is impossible to define "serious injury", the courts will not be able to give
any guidelines and a great deal of money will be spent on fighting this issue.
In short, an index-related periodic payment scheme within a negligence
system may prove to be prohibitively expensive.
From the above, it is felt that there will be no savings if the Pearson
Commission proposals were to be implemented in the areas of road and
industrial accidents. The effect of the recommendations would be to provide
generous no-fault benefits and a very expensive tort system for a limited
class of accident victims. This seems incomprehensible and indefensible.
Conclusions
It may seem heartless to reject the Pearson proposals when there are
recommendations in the Report which would benefit some victims of
misfortune but it is important to reject a complex and unwieldy scheme
which makes little sense from the point of view of either cost or justice.
Ultimately, the Pearson Commission is a failure because it misperceived
the role of a Royal Commission. In my view, the role of a Royal Commission
is to set out a coherent philosophy of what it thinks should be done in a given
field of public policy. In setting out its philosophy, the Commission, must
obviously take into account the views of various groups but a Commission
loses its raison d'etre when it abandons the search for statements of principle
[241 Quoted in para. 572.
[251 Ibid.
[261 The British Insurance Association, while maintaining that they were opposed to a system
of periodic payments and to inflation proofing stated that "the commercial insurance
market could if necessary service a system of periodic payments"; ibid.
and tries to act as a broker between various competing groups. The task of
making political compromises is best left to politicians. When a Royal
Commission sees its role as making political compromises, it has no value
because those political compromises would have been made through the
political process anyway.
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